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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HYRUM JENKINS and BELLE
MOYLE JENKINS, his wife,
Plaintiffs and .Appelloots,
-vs.JOHN B. ~fORGAN, WILLIS MORGAN, ALBERT MORGAN, BERT
MORGAN, ETHEL G. MORGAN,
1L L. BUXTON and MILO BURRASTON,
Defenda;nts and Respondents.

'

Case No.
7826

Appellants' Brief
THE FACTS
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Hyrum Jenkins
and Belle Moyle Jenkins, his wife, from a judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the
sum of $24.00, together with interest thereon at 6% -per
annum from and after September 2, 1947 and their costs
in the sum of $................ , which judgment is dated J anuary 10, 1952.
This action was commenced by the plaintiffs filing
an action against John B. Morgan, Willis Morgan, . Al~
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bert Morgan, Bert Morgan, Ethel G. 1\iorgan, ~f. L. Buxton and Milo Burretson, the latter two being bondsmen
on a supersedeas bond on appeal in the sum of $1,000,
bearing date of September 2, 1947, which was in case
No. 14026 of the Fourth Judicial District Court, or Supreme Court, Case No. 7108.•Judgment in that cause
'vas entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendants for quiet title to certain properties and the
defendants, except these bondsmen aforesaid, filed a
notice of appeal and said defendants, including the two
bondsmen, did on the 3rd day of June, 1947, file a $300
cost bond and the defendants did on the 5th day of
J nne, 1947, including the bondsmen, did file $100 supersedeas bond based on an order fixing the amount of
undertaking the bond on appeal in an ex parti matter
before the court on the lOth day of June, 1947. lVIotions
were duly filed .by the plaintiffs for exception to sureties
and reconsideration of the amount of bond.- The Ron.
Joseph E. Nelson did on the 27th day of August, 1947,
call up for reconsideration on motion of plaintiffs the
determination of the amount of undertaking of bond on
appeal based upon the affidavit of plaintiffs that it was
their desire to have the ground made available to them
for breaking of the ground and the planting to grain
which would mature and be harvested in 1948, and that
the value of said ground was the sum of $20.00 per acre.
Further that plaintiff had made arrangements for the
drilling for water on said ground, and that the plaintiffs
during the period of appeal desired the property for
agricultural purposes. At this hearing plaintiffs adduced
f~vidence of the availability of the ground for agrirul-
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tural purposes and the matter w·as continued to September 2, 1947, at 'Yhich time plaintiffs adduced further
evidence showing the availability for breaking the 160
acres of ground under question and the drilling for
'Yater, and on said date the Ron. Joseph E. Nelson did
order the increase of bond to $1,000; that the defendants,
including the bondsmen, did then file a new supersedeas
bond in the sum of $1,000 on the 2nd day of September,
1947.
The costs incident to the appeal in case No. 7108
were paid by the defendants, but no money was paid by
reason of the withholding of the ground from the plaintiffs between September 2, 1947 and August 16, 1948
when this court did render its decision in case No. 7108,
affirming the decision rendered by the Ron. Joseph E.
Nelson. This action was then brought upon the bond of
the defendants for the value of the use of the withholding
on the part of the defendants, between September 2,
1947 and the 9th day of September, 1948, upon "\vhich
date the remittitur in case No. 7108 was docketed in the
Fourth District Court.
Trial in this matter was had. on November 26, 1951
and December 3, 1951 and the judgment of this court in
the sum of $24.00 in favor of plaintiff was entered on
January 10, 1952, from which this appeal is taken.
The issue involved is whether or not the measure
of damage of the value for use for the withholding of
the property by the defendants fron1 the plaintiffs is to
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be based upon the value of use as grazing ground, which
is the position which the trial judge took in this matter
or the value of the use as agricultural ground.
David S. Powelson, called as a witness for the plaintiff, testified that he knew this particular property during his lifetime and that his business was that of a
farmer all his life in and about the Goshen area; that
he had been on this particular ground involved in the
years 1946 and 1947 with the intent of purchasing the
ground from the plaintiffs, and that he did enter into a
contract with the plaintiffs for the purchase of the same
on May 17, 1947. (R. 27-28). That this witness did
receive the 160 acres of ground in question on December
6, 1948,. in accordance with the agreement entered into
with the plaintiffs (R. 33) ; that after receiving the
property he broke the ground in August of 1949 (R. 34);
that he likewise drilled for water and obtained the same
and that a crop was planted in the spring of 1950 (R. 36)
and that a harvest was made in 1950 (R. 36) ; that of
said harvest approximately 75 or 80 acres was in dry
land wheat and 30 acres was in irrigated wheat; that
the 80 acres of dry farm wheat yielded 15 bushels per
acre and the 30 acres of irrigated grain yielded 40 bushels
per acre. (R. 37). That during the year 1946, or 1947,
this witness went onto the property in question with
Mr. Marcellus Palmer, a land specialist, to determine
the depth and quality of the soil (R. 38-39). That the
reasonable rental value of this 160 acres of ground for
farming purposes was 'vorth $30.00 per acre on the
irrigable ground (R. 42) and on the non-irrigable ground
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the reasonable rental value per acre was $10.00 per
acre. ( R. 42-43). That there was 25 acres of irrigated
potatoes. (R. 44).
Hyrum Jenkins called as a witness and identified
the agreement "l'ith David S. Powelson (Ex. B) (R. 60)
and then identified a photostatic copy of deed to David
S. Po,velson and Arnold Dewitt Trotter deeding the
property in question (Ex.· C.R. 60).
~Iarcellus

Palmer called as witness for plaintiff
stated his qualifications as an expert and that in August
of 194·7, he made a detailed examination of the property
in question. (R. 76). On this examination he made six
soil tests to a depth of four feet and described the forage
and vegetation then growing on the land (R. 77). He
testified that for dry land agriculture a yearly rental
value per acre would be about $10 per acre and if it
were nsed for irrigated agriculture about $30.00 per
acre. ( R; 82). On cross examination he testified that
rentals are based upon about 50% for the type of crqps,
wheat, alfalfa, barley or oats. (R. 83).
David S. Powelson recalled to the stand identified
Ex. '' E '' an assignment of his interest to the plaintiff.
(R. 91). On cross examination witness testified that he
rented comparable land in 1948 and 1949 for $30 per
acre which land was under irrigation. (R. 93). rrhat the
ground under question approximately 30 years ago had
been planted to corn. (R. 95). That the dry farm ground
'\vas ·broken up in August of 1949 and drilled for water
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which was obtained in the spring of 1949. (R. 97). That
grain was planted in the ground dry farm in 1949 and
the irrigable land planted in the spring of 1950. (R. 98).
That the cost of producing water per acre is about $2
per acre. (R. 103) .
•John B. Morgan, one of the defendants, called as
witness for plaintiffs, was present in Court on September 2, 1947 in Judge Nelson's Court Room when the
Judge ordered the bond in this case raised to $1000. (R.
106-107). And he was present in Court when Mr. Jenkins testified that he desired possession of the ground
for the purpose of having the same broken and drilled
for 'vater. (R. 113). rrhat he did not remember Mr.
Monsen testifying as to his agreement to break the
ground. (R. 114). And that he did recall Mr. Jenkins
testifying that he desired the use of the ground for
agricultural purposes. (R. 114-115).
Willis Morgan, called as witness for plaintiffs, was
present in c·ourt on August 27, 1947 when Mr. Richard
Trotter testified that he was ready, willing and able
under an agreement at that time to break this 160 acres
of ground. ( R. 117-118) and he likewise had a recollection of hearing Mr. Jenkins testify at the trial on the
bond matter. (R. 118).
· Albert Morgan, a defendant called as a witness for
the plaintiffs, testified that he had been e~perimenting
with dry farm wheat on adjacent property planted in
the fall of 1950 and harvested in 1951 and the ground
6
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yielded right near 9 bushel per acre. ( R. 122). That he
likewise has filed an application for drilling for water
on said ground and hoped to get 3 or 4 feet of water.
(R. 123).
Bert ~!organ, a defendant, called on behalf of plaintiffs, remembered being in Court on August 27, 1947
when 1Ir. Trotter testified to his ability and willingness
under an agreement to break the ground then known as
the Jenkins property and was like"rise present on September 2, 1947 when Hyrum Jenkins testified that he
desired the ground for agricultural purposes. (R. 137).
Dewitt Trotter, a witness called for plaintiffs, testified that the ground was first broken in 1949 and that
it would take approximately 30 days to break and prepare the ground. (R. 150). That Mr. Monsen broke the
ground with a wheat land plow and the first crop was
planted in the early spring of 1950. That he planted
dry land wheat to 80 acres, 47 acres of irrigated wheat
and 20 acres of potatoes. (R. 154). That from the dry
farm wheat they received a little over 1200 bushels and
irrigated wheat 1885 bushels. (R. 155) ~
Raymond E. Monson, testifying for plaintiff, stated
that on September 2, 1947 he was ready, willing and able
to go on the land in question and break the same. (R.
161). That between September 9, 1948 and January 1,
1949 he wa~ tied up on another contract and "ras not
available with his heavy type of equipment to break this
ground. That in the months of October, November and
7
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December, 1948, the snow came early and hindered him
in the breaking of ground and that had he been on the
ground on October 1, 1948, with a snow fall on the same
he could not have completed the breaking of the ground.
(R. 163). That 80 acres of the ground broken was of tall
sage brush, higher than his head and that from his experience as a farmer the ground broken was adaptable
and: very fine for wheat. (R. 165).
A certified copy of the application for drilling for
water on this ground (Ex. "G") \Vas received. (R. 174).
David S. Powelson, recalled to the stand, stated that
he had agreed to lease the property in question from
O.ctober 1, 1947 to September 1, 1948 to one Ken Tachiki
for $30 per acre with water on and $10 per acre for the.
dry farm ground. (R. 246.).
The defendants called 10 witnesses including the
defendants as to the value of grazing_ ground in the area.
At the conclusion of the testimony the defendants
moved to strike all the testimony of the plaintiffs as to:
1. Any intended use of the land other than the
established use to which it was deeme-d put at- the time
the supersedeas bond was filed.
2. All testimony of plaintiffs and his witnesses
touching the question of what had ·been done with this
property since · the deed "'. . as made from Jenkins to
Powelson and Trotter on December 6, 1948.
8
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3. .AJI testimony· of plaintiffs and his witnesses
that had to do with special damages.
4. All testimony pertaining to an oral contract or
conversation bet,veen Po,velson and the J ap which was
received as bearing on the rental value or value of the
use of· the property.
The Court ruling on said motion overruled the same
on grou~ds 1 and 3 as stated and granted the motion to
strike as to grounds 2 and 4.
The Court at this time gave his oral decision in
\vhich he stated:
"The affidavit in support of the motion for an
increase of bond specifically drew the defendants'
attention to the fact that the plaintiff had on the
26th day of February, 1947, made arrangements
for the breaking of the land concerning which the
judgment was entered.
The Court finds that by the filing .of the affidavit the defendant had full knowledge of that
arrangement. The Court finds that because. of
the supersedeas the plaintiff 'vas deprived of the
possession of tp.e lanq ...
The Court finds that a.t that time the land was
unbroken, uncultivated and undeveloped native
pasture land and finds that the reasonable rental
value of that ground was 15c per acre per year
and. that .there were 160 acres of ground.
For the use and occupancy of the ground
within the contemplation of the parties and based
. upon the ordinary b~si~ of recovery the .plaintiff
· is entitled ··.to judgment against the. defendants
and each thereof for the snm of $24.00 .
.9
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The Court further finds that there is insufficient evidence in this record by which the Court
could determine any damages to the plaintiff
specially by reason of the arrangement that had
been made by the plaintiff prior to the placing of
the supersedeas bond for the breaking, development and cultivation of that ground; and that
because there is no evidence upon which the Court.
could measure such damages, special damages are
denied.''
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THE l\IEASURE OF DAMAGE ON THE BASIS OF
·GRAZING GROUND INSTEAD OF AGRICULTURAI_J
GROUND.
POINT II.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
TESTIMONY WHICH WAS PERTINENT TO DETERMINE THE VALUE OF THE USE OF THE
GROUND.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGE ON THE BASIS OF
GRAZING GROUND INSTEAD OF AGRICULTURAL
GROUND.
In Park vs. JJfoorman Mfg. Co., et al., 241 Pac. 2d,
914, ·--·-- Utah ______ , Justice McDonough at page 920 said:
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''The fundamental principle of damages is to
restore the injured party to the position he would
haYe been in had it not been for the wrong of the
. other party."

In Moorhead vs. Jlllinneapolis Seed Co., 165 N. W.
484, L. R. A. 19180, 391. The Court at page 394, said:
"The object .of the law is to furnish a measure
" . hich will give, as near as may be, actual compensation for the breach, and which is free of uncertain, contingent, conj·ectural or speculative
elements. When damages are based upon the
value of the use of the land the uncertainty of
amount because of uncertainty of crop results is
eliminated, and they may be assessed forthwith.
We are of the opinion that when the failure of
crop is entire, because of failure of germination,
the damages should be based on the value of the
use, with additions and deductions suiting the
conditions of the particular case. The objection
suggested by the plaintiffs that there was no fixed
rental value in North Dakota is without substantial merit. There need be no market rental value.
It is enough if the use value is determined, and
that- may be found without the aid of a market
value. Farmers and others qualified to testify
may furnish proof of value.''

In the case of Pritchard Petroleum Co. vs. Farmers
Co-op Oil & Supply Co., 190 P. 2d 55, 121 lVIont. 1, Justice Gibson at page 58 said:
''The action afforded by the statute is to recover the value of the use of the property for the
period of its wrongful detention, not exceeding
the time :fL~ed by the statute. The value of the
use is the value to the o'vner of the property, not
11
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its value to the wrongdoer. Compensation is the
purpose and basis of the action.''
We cite Sed~vick on Damages, 8th Ed., Volume 1,
Sec. 252, page 376 as follows:
VALUE FOR A PAR'l'ICULAR USE
"The value of property is to be estimated with
reference to the most remunerative use for which
it is adapted. So in N. J., where the value of a
horse was in question, Whelpley, C. J. said in
Farrell vs. Colville, 30 N. J., L. 123, 127, 'They
were entitled to have the value of the horse as a
horse to be used in their business, and fitted for
that use. Perhaps he would not have been worth
anything as a fast trotter or as a gentleman's
carriage horse, because not adapted to the work~
but that \vould not depreciate his value as a cart
horse, for which purpose he was to be used'."

Sedwick on Damages, Vol. 1, 8th Ed., Sec. 253, page
377:
POSSIBLE FUTURE USE
''The present value of property may be enhanced by the possibility of making a more remunerative use of the property than the present
use. Such possible use is to be considered. In
Montana Ry. Co. vs. Warren, 6 Mont. 275, 284
per Bach J., the Supreme Court of Montana said:
'The respondent was allowed to prove the value
of land for town lot purposes. He had the right
to do so, whether he had built upon it or not. As
we have seen, the question is not to what use the
land had been put. The owner has a right to
obtain the market Yalue of the land, based upon
its availability for the most valuable purposes
for which it can be used, whether or not he so
12
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used it.' ln ~Iississippi & R. R. Boo1n Co. vs.
Paterson, 98 U. S. 403, 407, the plaintiff in error
had taken land of the defendant in error by the
right of eminent domain, and compensation was
sought in this action. The jury found that the
land 'vas worth but $300 for any other than boom
purposes, but a very much larger sum for such
purposes, and the Supreme Court of the U. S.
held that the larger sum should be awarded.
Field J., said: ''In determining the valu,e of land
approp-riated for public pu,rposes, the same const~dcrations are to be regarded as in a. sale of
property between private parties. The inquiry in
such cases must be what is the property worth in
the market, viewed not merely with reference to
the uses to which it is plainly adaptable: that is
to say, what is it worth from its availability for
valuable uses? Property is not to be deemed
worthless because the owner allows it to go to
waste, or to be regarded as valueless because he
is unable to put it to any use. Others may be
able to use it, and make it subserve the necessities
or conveniences of life. (Italics ours)
Neu.;ark Coal Co. vs. Upson, 40 Ohio St. Rep. 17.

In this case Upson acquired 23 acres of ground and
was developing the property for coal when the Newark
Coal Company obtained an injunction on the premises.
This injunctive proceeding was later voluntarily dismissed and Upson brought this action. The question
arose as to what rule should damages be a\\'arded by.
C. J. Granger at page 25 said:
''There being no market value of the rights
taken from Upson and his associates the only
practical rule for setting its value is to follo\v the
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ordinary common-sense practice of business men.
Made known to the body charged with the assessments, as fully as legal evidence can do it, all the
facts that naturally and materially affect the
value of the use of the rights of which the plaintiffs below were 'vrongfully deprived. These facts
necessarily include the location, thickness, quantity and value of the coal that was mineable then,
and then, the facilities for transporting that coal
to a market; the nature and extent of the demand
for that coal, the total expense of placing it in
the market (this included also all preliminary expenditures) ; the competition with which they
must contend; the contingencies in the demand
and supply of labor; the relation of the 23 acres
to other mining lands of Upson and his associates,
for 'vhich they could use part, or all, of the same
approaches, the total cost of the coal to them, and
the prices for which it 'vas saleable during the
period of suspension; all these facts naturally
affecting the value of the right to prosecute that
business with that coal, at and from that place,
during that time. No one of them is my itself a
measure of value. Considered together, some of
them add to, others subtract from the value; and
then, after such a view, a common sense judgment
again subtracts a percentage for the contingencies that are ever presenting themselves in the
affairs of men.
Within these facts thus stated is the element
of ''profit'' on possible sales of coal, i.e., the
difference between the cost of it and its market
price. But it is there not as a measure of values;
not in order to be allowed by the jury 'as profits',
but to be treated as one of a mass of facts that
throws light upon the value of the use of the
rights taken from Upson, all of which the jurors
ought to have known and considered when computing the damages.''

14
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In .A.nderso-n l'S. Coltunb·ia Contract Co., 184 Pae.
240, 94 Oregon 171.
This is a case "·here the plaintiff sued to recover
damages for breaking the fish trap of plaintiff by defendant's tow boat and barges. The question arose as
to whether or not evidence was proper as to the catch
of the fish in the trap at the time of the damage and
whether eYidence of the catch of similar traps during
the period at which the trap was damaged could be
adduced, and also was it proper to allow testimony as
to the amount of the catch after the repair of the trap.
J. Harris, at page 248 said:
"While the past success of the trap is not controlling, it is nevertheless one of the factors which
may be taken into consideration, not as the measure of damages, but to aid the jury in estimating
damages. Post v. ~Iunn, 4 N. J. Law, 61, 63, 7 Am.
Dec. 570; Wood Transfer Co. v. Shelton, 180 Ind.
273, 101 N.E. 718. See, also, Jacobs v. Cromwell,
216 Mass. 182, 103 N .E. 383.
That there was a good run of fish during the
two weeks is evidenced, the plaintiff says, by the
fact that the weather conditions were good, by
the significant circumstances that other traps in
the same locality, but less favorably situated than
the Anderson trap, caught each day 'up to a
couple of tons a day,' and by the important fact
that, when the Anderson trap 'vas repaired, it
caught each day from 1600 to 1700 pounds of fish.
Does not this evidence of the catches made during
the two weeks, as well as the catches made immediately afterwards, serve to make more certain
any inference of usuable value that may be dra,vn
from prior results 'J? Obviously the testimony
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ab.out the run and catch of fish during the two
weeks when the trap was out of repair and the
catches made by the Anderson trap when again
put ~n repair eonst~tuted data which would be
very helpful in fixing the usable value of the trap
for those· two· weeks-. The fishing season is of
·comparatively short .duration, and consequently
.: the usuable value o~· the trap might be negligible
at one time of the year and considerable at an·other. In brief, the evidenc.e under discussion was
competent, not for the purpose of measuring the
compensation to be paid to the plaintiff, but for
the purpose of aiding the jury in estimating the
usable or rental value of the trap.''
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs contend that the Court 1n rendering its
oral ·decision on December 4, 1951 recognized the fact
·that ·the defendants ·w,.ere apprised of the use of the
ground which plaintiffs desired the same for during the
p:eriod of appeal. This point is recognized by the statement made by the Court as follows:
"The Affidavit in support of the motion for an
increas·e of bond spec~fically drew the defendants
attention-to the fact that the plaintiff had, on the
26th day. of February, 1947, made arr~rigements
for 'the ·breaking of the land concerning ·which the
judgment was entered.
··
The Court finds that by the filing of the affidavit that the defendants had full knowledge of
that arrangement.''
If the defendants had full knowledge by re-ason of
the two he~ririgs ·before· Judge· Nelson of the con tern-
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plated use of the land by the plaintiffs as agricultural
ground then clearly the defendants appreciated that by
ordering a. supersedeas bond in the sum of $1000.00 they
had kno\Yledge that Judge Nelson appreciated the contemplated use as was testified to by plaintiffs' witnesses.
If the defendants did not contemplate the use by the
plaintiff of the land for agricultural purposes they had
a perfect right at the time Judge Nelson ordered the increase on the supersedeas bond to allow the plaintiffs
to occupy the ground for whatever purpose they desired.
Otherwise the hearing on the question on the increase
in the amount of bond \Vas nothing but a futile gesture.
It is difficult to realize how the plaintiffs during
the appeal could have made it more clear that they desired to break and cultivate the ground unless they
forcibly took possession from the defendants. It was
entirely within the discretion of the defendants to either
post a supersedeas bond and· withhold possession during
the period of appeal from the plaintiffs or to surrender
the property to the plaintiffs and not hazard any question of damage between September 2, 1947 and September 9, 1948 which is the date the remittitur from this
Court was docketed with the Clerk of Utah County and
is the first time that the plaintiffs were legally entitled
to enter upon the ground.
It is contended that the damages to the plaintiffs
and appellants constituted a loss of the groun~ for agricultural purposes for a period of two y~ars as it "ras
physically impossible to break the ground until Sep17
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tember 9, 1948 at which time it was impossible to break
the ground for a 1949 crop.
Why would the plaintiffs have gone to the trouble
of filing an application for drilling for water and making
arrangements with Mr. Monson for breaking the ground
unless this particular tract was to be used for agricultural purposes. It has never been denied by the defendants that the use to which the plaintiffs desired to put
the ground was not made known to them at the time the
increase in the amount of bond was ordered.
By increasing the bond the defendants knew that
their liability would be greater due to the intended use
of the ground for agricultural purposes. Otherwise the
original bond of $100.00 'vould have been sufficient for
any damages for the withholding of the ground if it was
contemplated only as grazing ground.
POINT II.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
TESTIMONY WHICH WAS PER~riNENT TO DETERMINE THE VALUE OF THE USE OF THE
GROUND.
In the case of Anderson vs. Jensen, 265 Pac. 745, 71
Utah 295. This is a case where the plaintiffs were the
owners of 3¥2 ~iles of frontage of land on Sheep Creek
on the east side of the creek varying from 80 to 160
rods in depth. The defendants were the owners of lands
adjoining plaintiff on the east and the elevation of de18
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fendant 's lru1d 'vas higher and more exposed to storms
and "·inds than that of the plaintiff. That the land of
the plaintiffs was particularly desirable for lambing
sheep because it is 'varm, comparatively level and protected from the spring winds and storms and further
that it is a distinct advantage to have sheep while lambing, near "rater.
Late in April 1926 defendants drove their sheep
across a part of plaintiffs' land and while so doing a
number of lambs were born and the lambs and ewes of
defendant's were left upon plaintiff's land. Plaintiff
brought his sheep into the vicinity a few days later and
were unable to occupy their land by reason of the occupancy of the defendants and this action was brought to
recover damages for depriving plaintiffs of the use of
their property. J. Hansen, at page 746 said :
''As a general rule, when the owner of property is deprived of the use thereof the measure
of damages is the reasonable rental value of the
property during the time the owner is wrongfully
kept out of possession. Such, evidently, was the
view taken by the trial court.
It is also contended on behalf of the defendants that proof affecting any enhanced rental
value of the land in question because of its adaptability for lambing sheep is in the nature of
special damages and must be specially pleaded to
admit proof thereof. We are unable to agree 'vith
that contention. General damages, this court has
held, 'are the natural and proximate consequence
of, and are traceable to the act complained of and
those damages which are probable, traceable to,
and necessarily result from the injury, * * * and
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may be shown under the general allegation of
the complaint. Only those damages, which are not
the probable and necessary result of the injury
are termed "special" and are required to be
stated specially in the complaint.' Croco v. Railroad, 18 Utah, 311, 54 P. 9,85 44 L.R.A. 285 i North
Point Consol. Irr. Co. v. Canal Co., et al, 23 Utah,
199, 63 P. 812. Tested by this rule, it follows that
if the defendants did in fact deprive the plaintiffs of the use of their land the probable, traceable and necessary result was a damage to the
plaintiffs to the extent of the reasonable rental
value thereof. In determining such reasonable
rental value, the fact that the land may be valuable for lambing purposes is as proper a matter
of inquiry as is the fact that the land may be
valuable for grazing purposes. The ultimate fact
to be determined is the reasonable rental value
of the land, and any f~ct which aids in determining such ultimate fact is proper evidence under
the general issue of damages and need not be
specially pleaded.''
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs and appellants contend that the trial Judge
was in error in striking all of the testimony of the plaintiffs and their witnesses touching the question of what
had been done with this property since the deed was
made 'from Jenkins to Powelson and Trotter on Deeember 6, 1948 and further striking all testimony pertaining to an oral contract or conversation between
Powelson and the Jap which was received as bearing on
the rental value or value of the use of the property.
20
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.A.s 'Yas said in the case of Anderson vs. Columbia

Contract Company heretofore cited under Point I the
Oregon Court stated:
''Obviously the testimony about the run and
catch of fish during the two \\reeks when the trap
'vas out of repair and the catches made by the
. .~nderson trap when again put into repair constituted data 'Yhich would be very helpful in fixing
the usable Yalue of the trap for those two weeks.''

Ho"T other than showing 'vhat the ground "rould
yield ~or agricultural purposes could the Court determine
the usable value of this ground~ The testimony clearly
sho,vs that 1200 bushels of wheat 'Yere obtained from
80 acres of dry farm land and 1885 bushels of wheat were
obtained from 47 acres of irrigated land and that in
addition there 'vere 20 acres under irrigation planted in
potatoes. Thus, there would be 80 acres of dry farm
ground and 67 acres under irrigation and the value of
this ground as dry farm land was worth $10.00 per acre
and the irrigated land of 67 acres was worth $30.00 per
acre thus making a loss to the plaintiffs of a sum of
$800.00 for dry farm land and $2010.00 for irrigated land
all in the aggregate sum of $2810.00 for the period from
September 2, 1947 to September 9, 1948. Likewise there
was a loss of the ground for the year 1949 which would
in effect double the above amount which would be a
substantial loss to the plaintiffs .
•Just as this Court has stated in the case of Anderson vs. Jensen, the damages in this case are the natural
and proximate consequence of, and are traceable to tbP
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act complained of and those damages \vhich are probable,
traceable to and necessarily result from the injury.
Under the agreement dated May 17, 1947 between
Powelson and the plaintiffs and appellants it did not
matter whether Powelson desired to operate the ground
personally in 1947 or whether he leased the same to ·one
Ken Tachiki who had agreed with Powelson to pay
$10.00 per acre for dry farm acreage and $30.00 per
acre for the irrigated acreage if available in 1947. In
either event the plaintiffs and appellants would have
realized a substantial amount as ·consideration for the
deed.
To the date of the writing of this brief the plaintiffs
and appellants have been awarded the sum of $24.00 by
the judgment of Judge Dunford as consideration for the
deed passing from the plaintiffs and appellants to Powelson and Trotter.
The agreement between Powelson and Tachiki made
before the placing of the supersedeas bond distinctly
shows as an evidentiary fact what the value per acre
was worth to Tachiki if the property had been available
in 1947 for lease purposes. Thus the striking by the
Court of this testimony eliminates an element "rhich
should have been considered by the court as the value
per acre as agricultural ground; at least to the extent
of $10.00 per acre as dry farm ground even in the· event
no water was ever obtained.
22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is respectfully contended that the granting of the
motion on the part of Judge Dunford eliminated pertinent factors which should have been considered in determining the measure of damage.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the measure of
damage in this case should have been upon the basis of
the value of the ground for agricultural purposes. It
lay entirely within the hands of the defendants and respondents after the hearing before Judge Nelson, when
the supersedeas bond was increased to $1000.00 to either
surrender the ground to the plaintiffs and appellants
such that their arrangement for the breaking of the
ground and the sowing to crop could have been completed for a 1948 harvest, or to respond by filing a supersedeas bond as they did and to then have the question
of damage determined by reason of the 'vithholding of
said ground by the :filing of a supersedeas bond.
Simply because the ground was unbroken as of September 2, 1947 would not control for an intended use
which was amply made known to the defendants and
respondents.
It is further submitted that the striking of the testimony of plaintiffs and their witnesses concerning the
use of the ground after September 9, 1948 and the striking of the testimony of the lease arrangements between
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Powelson· and Tachiki prior to September 2, 1947 was
error upon the part of the Court.
It is respectfully contended that this Court should
remand this case to the 4th District Court for the assessment of damages on the basis of value as agricultural
ground.
Respectfully submitted,

W. D. BEATIE
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
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